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ABSTRACT
JOSHUA D. KIPP: Shorebank Corporation: A Model of Community Development
Through Commerce
(Under the direction ofDr. Ken Cyree)

Since the passage ofthe Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, banks and other
financial institutions have become more proactive about engaging in community
development initiatives. One bank holding company,Shorebank Corporation, has taken
this commitment to a new level by basing the whole of its practices around the promotion
ofcommunity development. By filtering through prior research ofthe corporation and
discussions with two founding members who have served as CEO and President ofthe
corporation, it has been shown that a commercially profitable business may be created
while using a business model centered around community development. This paper
looks to evaluate the degree ofsuccess ofShorebank’s model and identify specific points
for improvement upon this model for other businesses interested in initiating community
development through commerce.
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CHAPTER 1: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BECOMES A PART OF REGULAR
BANK CONSIDERATION
Community development is often an activity that society thinks of being dealt
with by not-for-profit organizations and wealthy individuals. Not until the second halfof
the twentieth century was there any significant feeling ofsocial responsibility by
corporations and certainly no move to force businesses into doing much beyond
providing services and/or products as advertised and turning a profit for the benefit ofthe
company’s stakeholders. After the civil rights movement brought discriminatory
practices to the forefi*ont of American politics, government finally began to address this
issue in regard to the banking industry in the face of discriminatory lending and
disinvestment in poorer, and most often minority communities.
In 1977 a federal law was passed with a stated purpose “to require each
appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency to use its authority when examining
financial institutions, to encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs ofthe
local communities in which they are chartered consistent with safe and sound operation”
(12 U.S.C. § 2901.3.b). In the eyes of many this was intended to combat the urban decay
which had swept through American cities over the past several decades. This law 12
U.S.C. § 2901-2908, more commonly known as the Community Reinvestment Act of
1977, or CRA, was a direct assault by the governing powers upon “redlining”, the
perceived cause of widespread urban decay. Redlining, in its basic form,is
discrimination by an individual or institution on the basis ofone specific characteristic of
the individual or group that is being discriminated against. The more explicit form of
redlining that the CRA deals with is that ofcredit discrimination. The term redlining
originated when lenders would outline particular geographic regions, often times nearly
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entirely populated by a particular minority group,in red ink on the map and decline to
lend to any individual or entity that resided within that geographic area.
Many pointed to the practice ofredlining and discriminatory lending as the chief
cause of urban decay in America as the residents ofthese poor communities would put
their money in depository institutions, who would lend these deposited funds outside of
the community from which the funds were received. Such actions left residents of
redlined districts with no means ofacquiring credit to purchase a home,renovate a
building or capitalize a new business venture. With so little credit being extended to
members ofthe community,redlined districts would be caught up in a downward spiral
of poverty and deterioration.
The CRA was passed despite fervent and almost entirely unified opposition to its
passage by the banking industry. At congressional hearings prior to the CRA’s passage,
Ron Giyzwinski ofthe Shorebank in Chicago was the sole representative ofthe banking
industry to speak in favor its passage. Bankers held great concerns that the CRA would
force them into making riskier loans and subsequently reduce their profits by increasing
their loan losses. This fear was a dramatization ofthe reality ofthe CRA requirements.
The CRA does not require any specific loan or even type ofloan to be made to
individuals in any community, but rather that banks demonstrate equitable lending
policies across all communities from which they accept deposits.
Compliance with the requirements ofthe CRA is monitored by four governmental
institutions: the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission(FDIC),the Office ofthe
Comptroller ofthe Currency(OCC),the Office of Thrift Supervision(OTS),and the
Federal Reserve Board(FRB). The purpose ofthese supervisory agencies evaluations is
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to “assess the institution’s record of meeting the credit needs ofits entire community’
and to “take such record into account in evaluation of an application for a deposit
facility”(12 U.S.C. § 2903.a). CRA evaluations are generally announced ahead oftime
and conducted on average every three years. The evaluating institution is required to
publish a written evaluation which is made available to the public at large. This public
evaluation must include the conclusions for every factor which was assessed, a discussion
ofthe reasons that led to such conclusions, and the rating assigned by the supervisory
institution(12 U.S.C. § 2906.b). The rating may be denoted by outstanding, satisfactory,
needs to improve, or substantial noncompliance in meeting community credit needs.(12
U.S.C. § 2906.b). Each regulator evaluates different classifications offinancial
institutions as per their general jurisdiction and is allowed to set their own set of
regulations to accomplish the purposes outlined in the CRA. The FDIC evaluates
insured, state-chartered banks that are not members ofthe Federal Reserve. The OCC
evaluates federally-chartered banks. The FRB evaluates state-chartered banks that are
members ofthe Federal Reserve. The OTS evaluates thrift lenders.
Constant discord between banks and community groups as to the necessity ofthe
strength ofCRA enforcement pressured a review ofthe enforcement beginning in 2002.
The review yielded a result favorable to the banking industry in 2005 after a proposal was
made by the FDIC and eventually approved. As a result ofthis proposal, a variety of
evaluative tests were formulated and are applied primarily on the basis ofthe size ofthe
institution under evaluation. Small institutions, those with less than $250 million in
assets, are subject to only a lending test, but are also evaluated more fi'equently than other
institutions. Intermediate sized banks, those with more than $250 million, but less than
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$1 billion in assets, are subject to a two part test, which looks at the components of
lending and community development services. Large banks, those with greater than $1
billion in assets, are subject to the original guideline as set forth in 1977 ofa three part
test comprising ofevaluation oflending, service, and investments. The variety in these
evaluation tests is intended to provide a fair and accurate evaluation ofan institution in
relation to its size and practices.
As progressive and beneficial a move as the CRA would ultimately show itselfto
be, the lending impact ofthe CRA merely stems the tide ofdisinvestment and allows for
moderate growth in inner cities. The impact ofthe CRA alone is not nearly enough to
help a community become revitalized. The increased lending provided by CRA
requirements did not create community development. In this sense I am defining
community development as “the deliberate and organized interventions to help catalyze,
guide, or develop” patterns ofcommunity structure or behavior(Blakely 29). For such
community development to be realized, communities have turned to community
developers, sometimes known as community development scientists. “Community
development scientists use the community as a network ofpeople, policies, programs,
institutions, and cultures that are the focal point for inquiry and the base for the
development ofaction or change strategems”(Blakely 16-17). This definition is broad
and allows for a myriad ofdifferent methods ofachieving the end goal of action or
change in the community. With that in mind, let us look at some ideas and principles
held about community development and proffer a means for using these ideas and
principles in achieving superior development results.
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Many community development theorists claim that community development
should provide “broadscale group processes that provide a means for citizens to be heard
directly”(Blakely 20). In theory, having each and every member ofa community be
heard would be a magnificent way for developers to ensure that the needs and concerns
ofthe community are being met. This would be due to the fact that each individual
opinion would allow a developer to construct a full picture ofthe community’s issues and
dynamics. On the other hand, individuals will inevitably look out for their own best
interests. Even when building a community development strategy, every business or
property owner will be lobbying for improvements which will provide them with
personal benefit such as improved their customer traffic and/or property value. It takes
little genius to recognize that such differing viewpoints by individuals in a community
will inevitably result in some degree of conflict amongst competing interests. While one
may argue that in the eyes ofa community developer “conflict is not seen as destructive
or divisive, but as a necessary(if painful) part ofthe growth process”(Blakely 21), it is
hard to agree that developers should not avoid conflict when possible.
With this in mind, might it not be more effective for a single entity to act as the
perpetuator ofcommunity development? Granted, putting the development initiative in
the hands ofone person or group is risky and in order to expect success one must rely
upon the assumption that the single entity will act in a manner that provides for the well
being ofthe entire community as opposed to solely acting in its own self-interest. On the
other hand,ifthe success ofthat single entity could somehow be intrinsically tied to the
further advancement or development, ofthe community, would that not ensure that the
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single entity would always be looking out for the well being ofthe community as a whole
and not merely itself or its close comrades?
Another premise that many community development theorists operate around is
that “the development specialist’s role is to provide education,information, and resources
so that local people can perceive their own needs and manage their destiny in a manner
beneficial to themselves”(Blakely 22). With its claim that people should have control
over the direction of development, this may seem to take away from the validity of my
assertion that community development might be best achieved by a single entity acting in
a manner beneficial to the community as a whole. To the contrary, ifthe development
entity were to be a bank, whose success is predicated in large part by the realization of
individual citizens’ ambitions and dreams,then that development bank would be able to
allow for individuals to “perceive their own needs and manage their destiny”(Blakely
22). At the same time,the bank would be capable ofeliminating some measure ofrisk
that individuals would be willing to take on, which could be detrimental to the
community as a whole. As with any community developer, a community development
bank would approach their “work with the assumption that any movement or alteration in
one part ofthe system has ramifications for other components”(Blakely 21). A bank
would be much more capable of making an unbiased assessment ofthe ramifications of
any single credit request or project as it is in the best interest ofthe bank ifeach member
ofthe community is finding success.
One ofthe most necessaiy tools to effectively accomplish community
development is that ofinvestible capital. While an individual community developer ora
not-for-profit organized for community development purposes, they may be able to
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scrounge up enough financial backing to provide some degree ofdevelopment fimding, a
financial institution, such as a bank, has a much greater volume ofinvestible fimds and,
in most cases, more fi-eedom in determining how and through whom they utilize the
fimds. As a financial institution, the bank obviously has access to a great deal offimds,
as is their business, but the less obvious advantage comes from the flexibility of
investment options. As a for-profit institution, the bank has the ability to engage in
almost any business deal that they feel could be profitable as opposed to the strict
restrictions, which limit the types ofinvestments that a not-for-profit development group
would be allowed to make. Due to this a bank, would obviously be a prime place to
begin community development not only for its’ ability to invest in large volumes and
with great diversity, but also because oftheir knowledge ofthe community in which they
operate and their intrinsic concern for the advancement and mutual improvement ofthe
community at large.
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Chapter 2: SHOREBANK’S FOUNDING AND HISTORY
The idea ofcommunity development initiatives by businesses is not new, nor, is it
the mere by-product ofthe Community Reinvestment Act’s(CRA)establishment of
regulatory principles in the banking industry. In general, community development
corporations are not-for-profit and organize with a purpose ofserving a particular
geographic region by providing services to help support the community. Community
development banks are slightly different from the average community development
corporation in that they are, like any other financial institution, highly regulated. The
regulations seem fairly simple to follow as they include little more than the same charge
that the CRA now gives to all banks of providing comprehensive service to low-tomoderate income individuals or those in the communities in which the bank conducts
business. A community development bank uses its regular banking practices to target the
disadvantaged members ofthe community and in the process help to promote growth and
improvement through economic development and quality oflife within the community.
A bank acting apart from other organizations can provide liquidity for community
projects and home improvements. In some situations these provisions alone can lead to
significant growth in the community, but many times the by-products ofsuch projects
and improvements counteract the positive impact to some by creating an adverse effect
on other members ofthe same community. In order to ensure a wholly effective
community development effort stemming from bank operations, certain other measures
must be taken along with the good intentions ofthe institution. Few groups have set up
such a comprehensive development effort. One ofthe first and most successful
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comprehensive community development banks was the Shorebank Corporation based out
of Chicago, Illinois.
In 1973, a proposal ofRon Gryzwinski to use a bank as a key actor in community
development began to materialize in the formation ofthe Illinois Neighborhood
Development Corporation(INDC),later to be known as the Shorebank Corporation.
Before describing exactly what this corporation was,let us take a look at where it came
from. Ron Gryzwinski, after graduating from Loyola-Chicago, did not pursue a
traditional banking career as might be inferred by his deep involvement the banking
industry later in life. On the contrary, he set out as a salesman for International Business
Machine Computers. Shortly after that, Gryzwinski went to work at a bank in Lockport,
Illinois, and eventually worked his way up to the position ofPresident ofthat bank.
When his Lockport bank organized the purchase of a failing bank in the Hyde Park area,
Gryzwinski had his first interaction with racial tension and community deterioration and
was pushed to engage in community activism. It is important to realize that banking was
not an initial passion of Gryzwinski’s, but also that Gryzwinski did not participate in
conununity activism until his career forced it upon him in order to find success. In Hyde
Park, Gryzwinski foxmd himselfin a position of national leadership in the effort for
minority lending. In 1971, Gryzwinski left Hyde Park Bank and joined the Adlai
Stevenson Institute, a think-tank for social issues hosted at the University of Chicago. It
was while Gryzwinski was at the Institute that he developed his initial proposal which
would later morph into the INDC(Taub 17-19). It is readily apparent that Gryzwinski’s
path was anything but a direct path seeking a remedy to a problem of ailing minority
communities. Some might even suggest that it was more than anything a by-product of
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the success that he found in lending to minority individuals in Hyde Park and the various
characters that he became involved with through his career.
In order to gain a complete understanding of Gryzwinski’s proposal and its
maturation, it is important to recognize some important relationships that Gryzwinski
established with his future business partners while at Hyde Park Bank. The first
individual was Milton Davis, a black graduate of Morehouse College. Davis was
employed at the University of Chicago, which is located in Hyde Park, and was a leader
of Chicago’s chapter ofthe Congress of Racial Equality(CORE). Gryzwinski also made
contact with Mary Houghton,a white graduate of both Marquette and Johns Hopkins
universities. Houghton was working as a program officer for the Johnson Foundation,
where she oversaw the distribution of philanthropic funds to not-for-profit organizations
in order to attempt to enrich the overall quality oflife ofindividuals. Lastly, Gryzwinski
became acquainted with Jim Fletcher, a black graduate ofNorthern Illinois University,
who was employed by the Midwest headquarters ofthe Office ofEconomic Opportunity
(OEC). Fletcher also had grown up in the near vicinity with Gryzwinski, less than five
miles outside ofthe South Shore community(Taub 18). The backgroimd ofeach ofthese
individuals is noteworthy because oftheir diversity. Ofthese four, who would become
the founding members ofthe INDC,there was diversity ofrace, schooling, employment
experience and many other attributes. With Gryzwinski being the only one to have had
any direct experience in the banking industry, it was clear that their intentions were not to
merely run a bank, but to work to further each oftheir individual pre-INDC ambitions
through the work ofthe INDC.
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After building these relationships, Gryzwinski’s time at the Institute afforded him
the time and resources to develop the proposal for what would be the INDC. The initial
proposal was even more multi-faceted than the realized version ofthe INDC. Gryzwinski
included in his initial proposal six organizations to make up this one community
development organization: a housing management and construction firm; a limiteddividend housing corporation; a Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment
Corporation(MESBIC); a neighborhood financial institution, similar to the model ofa
credit union; a not-for-profit institute which would obtain grants, conduct research and
provide job training for neighborhood residents; and a community organization to serve
as an investment trust(Taub 19). As may be readily apparent,this proposal held a focus
on community involvement and investment, possibly a product ofthe time ofits creation
as the 1960’s was marked by a sense ofpersonal empowerment. Despite this focus on
community involvement and investment,this community activism was never achieved, or
even particularly pursued, in the actual implementation ofthe INDC in part due to the
evolution of banking laws and the nature ofthe financial institution around which the
INDC was created. New regulations concerning bank holding companies allowed for
Gryzwinski to use a bank instead ofcredit union in his development corporation. The use
ofa bank has several inherent advantages over a credit union in this model. First, banks
are generally self explanatory. Most everyone understands exactly what the purpose ofa
bank is, while many people would not necessarily know the purpose of a credit union
upon first encounter. Second, banks hold a certain symbolic value to any community as a
sign ofstability and fiduciary responsibility that no other institution can provide to the
same extent(Taub 20). After a marginal amount of consolidation oforganizational
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responsibilities and maturation ofthe proposal, Gryzwinski and his partners began to
search for a venue to locate their corporation, which now only included four subsidiaries
of a single holding company.
Gryzwinski and his compatriots located a community on the south side of
Chicago known as South Shore. This community was marked by a recent overall decline
in its desirability and reputation on the whole. A large part ofthis was very probably due
to the great shift in demographics that the community had undergone. Historically, South
Shore had been a middle class community marked by high-end shopping and highly
accessible by non-residents and residents alike, as it is positioned only a few miles south
ofthe loop of Chicago. Physically, South Shore is an area 7/8 mile by 1.5 miles bounded
on its east by Lake Michigan and holding a population ofroughly 75,000 in 1973(Taub
29). In order to understand what Gryzwinski and his partners were intending to take on,
here are a few statistics about the population ofthe South Shore community at the time:
85.6% black
24% single person households
23% on welfare
83.7/1000 crime index(citywide was 37.7/1000)
23% ofannual family incomes under $6,000
4% of annual family income over $30,000
69.5% ofresidents had lived in South Shore under 4 years
(Taub 35-36;
It is clear fi-om looking at these statistics in the framework ofthe time period that not
only was South Shore crime-ridden, poverty stricken and highly volatile population, but
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also that in the face ofcontinued racial discrimination, those willing to offer aid to this
disintegrating community would be few and far between.
It was in this community that Gryzwinski decided to implement his theoretical
development infrastructure. Grzywinski and the INDC,did not choose the South Shore
community and then search for a bank to purchase in that community, but rather looked
for an opportunity to purchase a bank and that opportunity happened to arise in the South
Shore community. The bank that the INDC chose to purchase was the South Shore
National Bank. This bank which held approximately thirty eight million dollars in
deposits was pushing to move out of South Shore and into downtown Chicago, an action
blocked in part by Gryzwinski’s claims that the bank could be salvaged in South Shore
and in part by a particular large downtown banks desire to avoid new competition. After
having its request to move rejected, the South Shore National Bank sold to Gryzwinski
and the INDC for 3.2 million dollars: a sum made up of$800,000 in firm investment
commitments and $2.4 million loan personally guaranteed by Gryzwinski and his wife.
Gryzwinski’s personal guarantee ofthe $2.4 million ofthe purchase price is
representative ofthe bank’s future policy ofrequiring a personal guarantee from each of
its loan applicants(Taub 22).
The DSfDC was described by one author as “a peculiar hybrid company in the
private sector, incorporating both profit-seeking and not-for-profit elements while
committed to generating economic development”(Taub 3). This description is very
accurate in accentuating the juxtaposition ofthe setup and intentions ofthe INDC. INDC
was set up as a for-profit bank holding company,invested in by stockholders who were
not profit-seeking and acting with the traditionally not-for-profit purpose ofcommunity
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development and rehabilitation. Ofthe four entities ofthe INDC,the South Shore Bank
was the cornerstone ofall ofINDC’s efforts. South Shore Bank was established in 1973,
as a result ofthe purchase of South Shore National Bank by the INDC,and was intended
to operate as a full-service, for-profit bank in order to generate development credit
resources for the South Shore community.
The remaining three subsidiaries ofthe INDC were established in 1978 in order to
facilitate the bank in development activities which the South Shore Bank had found
difficult to accomplish within the constraints oftraditional banking practices. The City
Lands Corporation was set up as a for-profit real estate renovation and development firm.
The Neighborhood Fund was set up as a for-profit minority small business investment
corporation with ambitions to help capitalize small business ventures in the community.
As “gentrification often drives out the poor who cannot pay the new high rents or the
increased property taxes that result fijom neighborhood upgrading”(Taub 6), the INDC
did not want to press onward with development without taking into consideration the
negative impacts that these development activities might have on the lives ofindividuals.
With this in mind. The Neighborhood Institute was set up as a not-for-profit group to
work with residents who were displaced during renovation and development by providing
job training and placement. As a not-for-profit organization, the Neighborhood Institute
was funded almost entirely through grants and government contracts, which were used in
ftaiifing programs as well as physical development activities. The mutual effect ofthese
four subsidiaries ofthe INDC was to provide management with multiple faces and
avenues from which to raise and provide support to the ailing South Shore community as
well as the ability to use one or more ofthe subsidiaries to counteract any negative
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impacts that development efforts might have on specific individuals within the South
Shore community.
While each ofthese four subsidiaries played a significant role in the eventual
success ofthe ENDC and the South Shore community,for the purposes ofthis study, we
will focus on the efforts ofthe bank and its specific role and means ofcommunity
improvement. One ofthe major problems that Giyzwinski had seen in the South Shore
community was that disinvestment, or the withdrawal ofeconomic support for the
purchase and maintenance of buildings and businesses(Taub 59), was occurring at a high
rate and simultaneously initiating and compounding the effects ofan overall physical
deterioration ofthe community. Addressing this malady was a chiefconcern ofthe bank,
but many felt that the bank would be capable of making significant improvements on the
situation by going through the regular business activities ofa profit-producing bank.
With this in mind,the bank avoided proactively engaging the community in the decision
making process regarding development opportunities and efforts. The management felt
that “a group with the capacity to act, to make decisions, and ultimately to provide
positive symbols to rally round, may be more important than the backing and filling
which community involvement so often generates”(Taub 56). In this way,INDC and
ShoreBank varied greatly from the mindset ofother community development initiators,
who felt compelled to desperately seek out any and all opportunities for community
involvement.
ShoreBank looked to build the community first and foremost through increasing
the volume offunds which were being invested in the community. Unfortunately, with a
mere $38 million in deposits at the time ofits purchase in 1973, bank management had
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little ability to make a particularly large level ofinvestment. Management attempted to
remedy this situation by increasing local deposits first. Local deposits proved hard to
come by due to a myriad ofreasons including the fact that ShoreBank lacked the prestige
ofa downtown bank and most ofthe working members ofthe South Shore community
worked elsewhere and preferred to bank near their place ofemployment. While the bank
was able to increase the number oflocal deposit accounts, many ofthe balances were
very low, which caused them to be of marginal worth to the bank due to their comparably
high servicing costs. The first real success in attracting deposits came with the creation
ofthe development division ofthe bank, which was headed by Mary Houghton. This
division came up with the idea of“development deposits”. These deposits were solicited
from outsiders who were attracted by the fact that they would receive the same deposit
services as at any other bank, but at the same time their deposits would be “doing good”
(Taub 63). In the early years ofthe bank, it could be argued that is was these
development deposits that kept deposit levels high enough to allow for the bank to
ctigage in development lending.
From the outset, lending was difficult for the bank to engage in effectively. Many
variables played into the challenging nature oflending in the South Shore community,
chief among them was the aforementioned lack offunds, but beyond that, there were
challenges in determining the most appropriate strategy in terms oftypes ofloans the
bank should be making. Consumer loans look promising as development tools as they
represent individuals having access to money for personal advancement and property
improvements, but early on consumer loans proved unreliable as a source ofrevenue due
to the combination ofan astonishing lack ofdemand, high collection costs and even
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higher default risks(Taub 60-61). Bank management then began to look at mortgages as
an opportunity to allow residents to establish equity in a home. Management was able to
use private mortgage insurance to back the banks aggressive mortgage lending, but
success in this area was limited as single family housing made up a mere 15% ofthe
housing in the South Shore community(Taub 67). Management’s pursuit ofcommercial
loans was very aggressive. Conunercial loans could do much to revitalize the area and
help to create individual wealth along the way. Management even went to great lengths
of becoming an expert on packaging Small Business Administration(SBA)loans. While
this effort was well received and the bank pursued commercial loans in the same manner
that Gryzwinski had successfully done so in the past, commercial lending never became
as

successful as had been hoped and saw many more failures, despite hours ofbank

assistance, than success(Taub 61-65).
I do not intend to discuss in detail all ofthe successes or failures ofShorebank’s
early years, but feel it necessary to mention several so as to indicate the nature ofthe
challenges management was facing and the means by which they overcame them. First,
it is important to note that many failures were not necessarily the fault ofthe bank, or the
commumty, but rather exacerbated by outside forces beyond anyone’s immediate control.
The bank began to aggressively solicit loan requests within the community. This
aggressive style led not only to bank representatives pursuing those with business plans,
but also suggesting business ideas outside conventional realms ofthinking. In 1974,
bank officials were able to convince the CNA Financial Foundation to agree to help
initiate ajoint venture of Chicago’s top corporations to create a fifteen million dollar
development fund for the advancement ofthe South Shore community. Shortly after
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beginning the project and producing the promotional materials to be used to convince
Chicago’s top corporations that this project was going to be effective and influential and
that South Shore was the right community to focus on,CNA sustained unforeseen
financial losses. With these losses, CNA could no longer operate and was taken over by
Loew’s, who cut the South Shore project almost immediately(Taub 88-89).
A similarly disheartening failure came in 1977. As South Shore had deteriorated,
nearly every major grocery chain had moved out ofthe area. National Tea, a major
national supermarket, came into South Shore with the intentions of purchasing a block
along 71^^ Street, the main drag of South Shore, on which they would locate one oftheir
stores. With the help ofthe bank. National Tea was able to purchase the property despite
community opposition, which had spawned from the fact that some under maintained and
underutilized establishments already located on the targeted property would be shut down
or moved. A major supermarket would provide a sense ofpride for the community that
they were receiving top notch products, but merely one day after the land purchase and
subsequent eviction of current tenants. National Tea closed all ofits stores citywide. This
left National Tea and the bank with a block ofundesirable under maintained real estate
and a community that was upset about evictions, which now seemed absolutely
unnecessary(Taub 96).
While both ofthese prior examples show how outside influences stifled change in
the community, it was not the case that in all failures the bank was seemingly free from
responsibility for the failings. In 1976, a development group called the Phoenix
Partnership, which had been organized by Steve Perkins,formerly the public relations
and marketing director for South Shore Bank,came to South Shore with a plan to
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encourage more development The plan centered on 71^ street and set out to buy three
blocks of street-front property and coordinate their development. In theory, coordinated
development and a single owner could regulate the stores which came into this area and
could cause a unified and sizable improvement in the area through coordinating the
different businesses efforts. Due in part to the good planning and immense enthusiasm of
the Phoenix Partnership, South Shore Bank agreed to provide the initial fimding to
purchase the property. After a short while it became clear that the development project
would fail as solid renters were not found for many ofthe properties and the bank refused
to provide further financing for renovations ofthe property. The Phoenix Partnership and
South Shore Bank both counted the project as a failure blaming each others shortcomings
as the reason for the failure(Taub 97-98).
Bank examiners did not look fondly on South Shore Banks development lending.
Despite the newly passed CRA,examiners were held much more responsible for
assessing the quality ofthe portfolios they were examining then the level ofcompliance
with the CRA (Taub 104). This fact made each failure even more burdensome on bank
management as they were given little to no leeway for the fact that most oftheir loans
were meant to be development, but rather were held to the same standards as every other
bank and were constantly questioned and second-guessed by the examining authorities.
Despite failures from within and without, from 1973-1978 the fact that South
Shore Bank even survived was a mind-boggling success. In the same span oftime,two
other banks in the community went out of business and the only other bank in such a
neighborhood that turned a profit was doing so because oftheir policy oftaking deposits
from the community and almost solely investing those funds outside ofthe community
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(Taub 101-102). South Shore Bank was succeeding at its mission beyond remaining in
business too. For example, bank management was able to convince the city to sponsor a
$750,000 renovation ofthe sidewalk area along 71^* Street in order to make it more
aesthetically pleasing and encourage more businesses to locate in this area(Taub 98).
One ofthe greatest successes came in 1976 when a sub area banker program was
launched in order to combat a pervasive sense of distrust towards the bank and
disillusionment about the future of South Shore within the commumty. This program
began with focus on one neighborhood within the community,Parkside, which also
happened to be South Shore’s most deteriorated neighborhood. The purpose ofthe
program was to assign a banker to a small area and have that banker establish personal
relationships with the members ofthat area. In theory, such relationships would dispel
the distrust that individuals felt towards the bank as well as generate an increased volume
ofloan requests. While this program did not save Parkside by itself, it did succeed in
generating loan requests and developing trust and a working relationship between the
bank and this particular neighborhood(Taub 90-92).
Another success, like many ofthe successes which the bank saw in its early years,
came from recruiting outsiders to take an interest in the South Shore community.
Grzywinski along with the head ofthe Illinois Housing Development Authority recruited
RESCORP(Renewal Effort Service Corporation)to bring their project to South Shore.
RESCORP was a consortium ofover fifty savings and loans organized to promote
investment in risky inner cities to prevent urban decay. Convinced that South Shore was
a prime community in which to begin their work, RESCORP spent $7.9 million from
1974-1978 in the process ofrehabilitating 302 units ofhousing. While this number in
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and of itself may be impressive,the effects were multiplied as the bank lent to the owners
of buildings near those rehabilitated by RESCORP in order to allow them to not appear
outclassed by RESCORP’s newly rehabilitated properties(Taub 80-82). A 1978 survey
of O’Keeffe, the neighborhood in which most of RESCORP’s development had taken
place, in comparison to the rest of South Shore showed a marked improvement in the
opinion ofthe community’s direction:
What do you think South Shore will be like in five years?
O’Keeffe Residents

Rest of South Shore
34.7
23.6
41.7

Better
60.0
The Same
12.9
Worse
27.1
*numbers in percent

(Taub 85)

It is clear that O’Keeffe residents had been encouraged by the rehabilitation projects as
72.9% of O’Keeffe residents felt that South Shore would not deteriorate in the next five
years while 41.7% of other South Shore residents felt that South Shore would be worse
off in five years.
The single greatest success in the early years ofthe INDC was easily the decision
in 1978 to reorganize in order to create a more efficient system of achieving their
commumty development goals. This reorganization was made possible by utilizing an
obscure bank holding company law and by returning to the basis of Grz5rwinski’s initial
proposal(Taub 113). One ofthe components ofthis change was the creation of The
Neighborhood Institute(TNI). TNI served as a not-for-profit organization that focused
on the social aspect of development. TNI sought to renovate properties that no for-profit
organization would be capable ofrenovating as well as provide job training, education,
community advocacy and many other social services. TNI was an intrical part ofthe
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INDC’s continued success because it was capable ofreceiving grants and other sources
offunds, by virtue ofits not-for-profit status, that the bank,for example, was unable to
receive(Taub 116-117). When Jim Fletcher and Michael Bennett took charge of TNI,
TNI became more focused on the idea ofempowering the downtrodden ofthe
commumty. This focus caused TNI to push for action that supported individuals in the
commumty,even at times when the good ofthe individual did not favor the good ofthe
bank or the INDC,as a business(Taub 118). TNTs early actions were predominantly of
a concrete nature due, in large part, to the requirements ofthe various foundations, which
proved to be the chiefsource offlmding for TNI(Taub 119-120). TNI also had many
programs which helped to advance the community,such as its GED program that
operated on city and state funding and had 740 individuals pass through the program
from 1979 to 1983(Taub 120).
In addition to TNI,the reorganization saw a great influence from the development
ofthe City Lands Corporation(CLC). CLC was created in 1978 to get the INDC
involved in the real estate market. Initially capitalized with merely $150,000, CLC was
expected to grow itselfas a for-profit real estate entity(Taub 122). The first director of
the CLC only led the organization for about a year as it was soon discovered that a
former carpenter, contractor and work supervisor, while knowledgeable in real estate and
the building process was not qualified to be running this real estate firm (Taub 121). The
greatest success ofthe CLC came through the Parkside Partnership, which combined the
efforts ofthe CLC,RESCORP and the First Chicago Neighborhood Development
Corporation. This partnership’s efforts to improve the Parkside neighborhood showed
results in that “by the end of 1985, dreadfully unmaintained structures were the exception
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rather than the rule”(Taub 124)despite the fact that previously poorly maintained
structures were pervasive in the community.
Both CLC and TNI were capable of providing an aggressive ^proach to
development that no bank would be able to carry out and a commitment to South Shore
that delivered a level ofcommitment which any business or other not-for-profit
organization could rationally be expected to match. These subsidiary organizations were
certainly not solely responsible for the successes seen fix)m reorganization. Even within
the bank reorganization was taking place, beginning with Mary Houghton’s move to
president ofthe bank. At the recommendation ofseveral experienced outsiders,
Houghton moved to make middle management more responsible for day-to-day
operations(Taub 114). Such a move fi-eed up the time of upper management to look at
the big picture and coordinate the various activities ofthe bank while providing personal
and effective service to customers at ground level. Houghton also chose to close the
development division, of which she had been the overseer, in order reduce the
disproportionately large size ofthe staffand allowed the outside groups being created to
supplement the regular development activities ofthe bank(Taub 114). Realizing a
problem in the service customers received, Houghton also improved the service received,
especially by those individuals who held Prestige accounts. This service included a
separate line in the bank building for such customers and a special staff member who was
permanently assigned to alleviating any problems that might come up with a Prestige
account. Such changes in service resulted in the opening of2,500 Prestige accounts with
an average balance of$6,400 by 1985(Taub 115-116).
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These early years of the INDC set the groundwork for the continued success that
the company has continually experienced since its inception. From the successes and
failures that came to fruition during the early years ofthe INDC, we can leam certain
characteristics which when taken into account can help to ensure a more successful effort
in trying to implement similar development strategies in other communities.
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Chapters: ANALYSIS OF SHOREBANK’S PERFORMANCE
Before declaring Shorebank’s efforts an unquahfied success, it is important to
look at how successful, or unsuccessful they have really been. It is easy to say that
Shorebank has turned a profit on a regular basis, remained in business for over thirty
years and the South Shore community has not fallen to shambles, which proves that
Shorebank has experienced success, but these statements must be evaluated in order to
determine how successful Shorebank has been both in terms of profitability and
development.
First, let us turn our attention to Shorebank’s success in terms ofprofitability. It
is true that Shorebank has turned a profit on a regular basis and that they have remained
in business. It is also true that very few banks actually fail, as this is closely monitored
by government institutions due to its devastatingly adverse effects on the community in
which any bank may fail. In other words, it is more important to look at profitability
from a comparative point of view in addition to whether or not a bank turned a profit or
stayed in business.
From FDIC
12/31/06
12/31/06
Shorebank
Avg. of all banks
>$1B
Yield on
earning assets
Cost of earning
assets
Net Interest
Margin
ROA
ROE
Net charge-offs
to loans

12/31/05
Avg. of all banks
>$1B

12/31/05
Shorebank

6.53%

6.61%

6.05%

6.24%

3.13%

3.71%

1.80%

2.89%

3.39%

2.90%

4.24%

3.35%

1.33%

0.60%

1.00%

0.86%

13.02%

8.64%

8.21%

11.81%

0.41%

0.13%

0.21%

0.17%

www.fdic.gov
28

Looking at these ratios is a good way to compare Shorebank’s performance with
the performance of banks which are comparable in size, which may or may not work with
a similar focus towards community development in their service area. Shorebank’s
performance is above average in the categories of yield on earning assets and net chargeoffs to loans, but below average in every other category including net interest margin,
return on assets and return on equity. Such results provide a strong argument against
Shorebank’s business model being particularly lucrative. Shorebank is clearly earning
money, as is indicated by their above average yield on earning assets. One would
generally expect that Shorebank is losing money due to the riskiness oftheir loan
portfolio, as the overwhelming bulk is invested in a low-income community, but this
expectation is contradicted by the fact that Shorebank’s net charge-offs to loans is less
than one-third ofthe average for similarly-sized banks.
Without the general riskiness ofthe bank’s lending practices to blame for its
below standard profitability, we must turn to the question of what is in fact causing such
a small level ofprofitability that Shorebank’s ROA would be less than halfofthe average
and their ROE would bejust over halfofthe average. The first reason that stands out as a
cause of Shorebank’s decreased earnings is the fact that Shorebank’s cost ofearning
assets is over 0.5% above the average. This high cost of assets is the direct cause of
Shorebank’s low net interest margin. Once net interest margin is explained there is no
question as to why ROA and ROE are both below average. Whether or not a low net
interest margin is the sole or primary cause ofthe low ROA and ROE is of little
importance, because regardless, we can be sure that it is a significant contributor to these
low profitability ratios.

29

The fact that must be elucidated is why Shorebank’s costs are so much higher
than those of its competitors and whether this is a cost which may be reasonably
eliminated by a bank following the model of Shorebank. It is evident from the early
years of Shorebank’s efforts that both deposits and loans for a community development
bank would be more labor intensive than is the case for most banks. Between seeking out
individuals and institutions to make development deposits and working alongside start-up
businessmen to ensure their success, Shorebank has constantly committed itselfto putting
in more hours per loan and deposit than is the norm for banks engaging in similar
business. This commitment to extra hours oflabor, and expenses related to them,can be
cited as making a significant contribution to the high cost attributed to earning assets at
Shorebank as compared to its competitors. While these extra efforts have raised costs,
they can also be pointed to for the drastically lower rate ofcharge-offs in proportion to
loans made at Shorebank. Perhaps Shorebank is being too cautious and spending too
much time on each project to ensure success. Management could leave some ofthe
projects up to fate and while charge-offs might increase,the cost ofearning assets would
be much more in line with the industry average.
It is important to note that leaving projects up to fate would be straying from the
ultimate goal ofensuring success in community development in favor of making a greater
profit. This exact balancing act is what Ron Grzywinski identified as the single greatest
challenge in operating a business that focuses on a stated position of promoting
community development. Grzywinski says that pursuing both missions simultaneously is
difficult because you have two different types of people working in his bank,those
focused on banking and those focused on development. Bankers tend to have a hard time
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looking to development and developers tend to have a hard time looking at the
practicality of the profitability numbers(Grzywinski, 2/11/08). Despite this balance
being so difficult to maintain, that is the exact issue on which one must focus in order to
ensure a successful enterprise in the field offor-profit community development banking.
Another issue to consider in terms of profitability is whether the bank is operating
at a maximum level of profitability. As the flagship of a bank holding company,the bank
may be both benefitted and inhibited by decisions made by the other entities which are a
part of the holding company. In a perfect world, all ofthe entities would work together
in order to create a synergistically induced increase in profitability and productivity for
each of the entities. According to Mary Houghton, this has neither been the case at
Shorebank in the past, nor is it the case currently. Houghton says that there is “very little
synergy” amongst the entities comprising Shorebank corporation. Each entity is more
concerned with their specific objectives than the success ofthe holding company.
Houghton also explains that this lack of synergy is “not so much of a concern.” Despite
the entities lack of collaborative efforts, six ofthe seven current not-for-profit entities can
be considered very high performing, while the other is dormant (Houghton, 2/11/08).
Houghton is correct in pointing out that high performance is being experienced by all of
the components while working independent of each other, and thus the lack ofsynergy is
not an overwhelming concern. There is still room for some concern, not because of
failures caused by lack of collaboration, but rather because of unrealized opportunities
due to lack of collaboration.
As a bank, Shorebank has limited funds and must make decisions keeping in its
view profit for the shareholders. Shorebank Corporation’s not-for-profit entities are
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granted the luxury of having a little less concern for profitability of a project, and as such
can take a greater risk for a project which may have a great deal of promise if successful.
With Shorebank and the corporation’s not-for-profit entities working together on
projects, each entity would realize greater success as they would maximize thenresources, both financial and other, and be able to take on a wider variety of projects. The
bank would do so by freeing themselves ofsome risk concerns and not-for-profits would
also do so by partnering with the bank to avoid some regulatory constraints. Such
synergistic efforts would allow increased productivity and profitability for all involved
and could easily increase profitability for Shorebank and render the bank more
competitive in terms of profitability ratios.
Besides profitability, one must evaluate to what degree Shorebank’s activity has
precipitated development in the community in order to determine the success or failure of
Shorebank in its endeavor to reinvigorate a dying community and still turn a profit for its
shareholders. From a recent visit to the South Shore community, it was clear that South
Shore has not evolved into a city on a hill or a glowing success that causes every outsider
to be impressed with its elegance and upscale nature. Fortunately, that was not the point
of Shorebank. As Richard Taub intimated in Community Capitalism, Shorebank did not
want to change South Shore into some ritzy community that would drive up property
values and force its current residents to move out. Rather Shorebank was committed to
improving the community’s standard ofliving while leaving the community affordable to
the common man. Evidence ofsuch achievement can be seen in the South Shore
community today. Seventy-first Street, which was the thorn in the side ofthe Shorebank
management team for years, has now been developed with major chains located along it
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including Walgreens, a Delchamp’s grocery store, and others. At the same time, these
stores are interspersed amongst the local ‘mom and pop’ stores, quick cash operations
and other businesses typical of lower income communities.
The housing market in the area appears to be dominated by multi-family housing
developments of 12 to 20 units. There is a reasonable degree of vacancy, which indicates
that individuals are moving within or out ofthe community, but there is not so much
vacancy as to indicate an exodus from the community or overdevelopment. Such
movement can often be a sign of individual achievement and progress and thus can be
seen as a positive sign for the community. Most ofthe housing in the area is well-kept, at
least on the outside, which indicates a sense of pride by those owners and tenants ofthe
housing in their community. This sense of pride goes a long way to show that the
sentiments of community members have changed from the time that Shorebank entered
the community when landlords and tenants alike failed to maintain the general
appearance of their businesses and domiciles.
Another point of emphasis for Shorebank was not to develop in such a way as to
push the individuals that they were intending to help out ofthe community. Many
developers engaging in projects in the same time period would overdevelop and push the
minority members of the deteriorating communities out of their homes. At times this
overdevelopment occurred to such an extent that while they saved the physical
community from devastation, the community of individuals post-development was
completely different from those who lived their originally. In South Shore many people
may have come and gone, but the community’s racial makeup has remained
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predominately African American, a group which has commonly been displaced in other
development efforts.
In this sense, the development efforts ofShorebank have been quite successful,
but not every development opportunity has been maximized and not every sign of
development has been positive to the entire community. It is clear to Shorebank’s
management that more can be done and sometimes more should have been done.
When considering the results that have been seen both in terms ofprofitability
and development, Houghton and Grz5^winski both admit that Shorebank has not met all of
their preconceived notions ofsuccess. Houghton said that she was surprised that people
did not get excited about this new business model and jump at the idea of a community
development bank. Houghton was also surprised as to how hard it was to execute on the
strategy of balancing development efforts and profitable lending(Houghton,2/11/2008).
Grzywinski said that he had expected to achieve the same financial profitability as the
four founders of Shorebank had experienced when working together at Hyde Park Bank,
but that this was never something that was realized (Grzywinski,2/11/2008). The fact of
the matter is that operating a for-profit business while trjdng to benevolently promote
development is quite a challenging task and one that decreases the effectiveness ofthe
organization’s efforts both in the direction of profitability and development.
In all reality, there is little argument to validate a claim that Shorebank has been
more effective than another development group would have been or even a particularly
lucrative business endeavor. Despite this fact, Shorebank has made a very significant
impact in the South Shore community and around the world. Against the odds,they have
consistently turned a profit in the process. While no one should laud Shorebank as the
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perfect business model,or anything close to it, such a business can be quite beneficial to
the community that it becomes involved with and can sustain itself instead of being left
subservient to the wishes and whims offoundations and private philanthropists. When
considering a for-profit, community development-centered husiness,the success that
Shorebank has experienced has “made it legitimate”(Grzywinski 2/11/2008). Before
Shorebank found success, no one would have imagined that such a business model could
provide for any type of profit. Shorebank proved this stigma incorrect and pushed many
banks above and beyond the minimal requirements ofthe Community Reinvestment Act,
leading them to look for profitability in community development projects and lower
income, or minority, communities.
Such an impact cannot be downplayed because it has precipitated a change in the
collective mind of an industry to embolden them branch out into previously ignored
commumties and classes ofindividuals. Even with this immense change already taking
place, greater success can be achieved in this realm through focused efforts and
experiential learning. There is no doubt that those communities with philanthropically
and developmentally-conunitted businesses will be able to reap benefits fi:om these
businesses actions. With that in mind,the question is not whether or not communities
would appreciate or benefit fi’om the actions ofbusinesses such as Shorebank, but rather
the question at hand is what would be the most efficient, beneficial and profitable means
ofa business providing such service to communities. Many groups have attempted such
ventures in a variety ofindustries and a variety oflocations. Not all ofthese efforts have
been as successful as Shorebank, but some have experienced great success and received a
great deal of recognition for their efforts. While a myriad ofapproaches might be taken
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to devise the most appropriate scheme for embarking on such a business endeavor, let us
m
look at how a community development bank might be effectively started and managed i
order to maximize their development and profitability potential. For the sake ofease, we
will use Shorebank’s creation and operating strategies as a basis and fi'om there turn our
attention to what steps could be taken to improve upon their efforts to most efficiently
maximize both the development in the community and the profits ofthe bank.
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Chapter 4: TRANSLATING SHOREBANK’S EXPERIENCE INTO FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
In general, I feel that the organization of Shorebank Corporation is a sound
organizational structure that with a few tweaks should be very effective in accomplishing
its goals. To determine the best set up for a community development bank, let us walk
through the steps of organization and operation in order to outline what would be
determined to be the best practices for each step. This will require looking at whether a
current bank should be acquired or a new bank founded, location, initial financing,
organizational entity interaction, management skills and operating actions.
Shorebank decided to purchase an existing bank in order to begin with some
infrastructure and equity, but this is by no means the only way to begin a project.
Grzywinski noted that “buying can be very expensive” because it may force the
purchaser to pay a premium above book value ofthe acquisition target(Grzywinski,
2/11/08). Despite this clear concern with making a purchase, starting a bank from the
ground up is no easier. It would be virtually impossible to start fi-om scratch in a
community that you are specifically targeted for the purpose ofturning the tides of
disinvestment. Gryzwinski even suggests that if necessary one might have to open a new
bank in a more affluent neighborhood and then expand into the neighborhood that was
the initial target ofthe bank. In the end though, it is almost invariably going to be easier
to acquire an existing bank to build off ofinstead of starting from the ground up.
Grzywinski cited the number one change that he would make if going through the process
of building up Shorebank again would be to stick to the initial strategy of purchasing an
existing bank when moving into new markets instead ofsimply starting from scratch
(Grzywinski, 2/11/08).
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Any business venture faces a towering challenge when deciding where to locate
their business, as the location can be a prime factor in determining the success, or failure,
of the business. A business which is looking toward initiating and perpetuating
community development efforts faces a unique set of obstacles when considering where
to locate. It may seem obvious, but noteworthy, nonetheless, that a business aspiring to
be actively pursuing community development in its community cannot locate in a
particularly well-to-do community. At the same time, such a business must resist the idea
of simply looking to the most destitute community and locating itself there. Southshore
was a good location to start such a venture because Southshore was beginning to see the
effects of disinvestment and the community was beginning to decline, but Southshore had
not hit rock bottom yet.
In order for a community to be a reasonable target community for community
development through commerce, commerce must still exist in the commumty. It would
do little good to enter a community in which there is no money. Such communities are
target communities for development from wholly not-for-profit organizations and
charitable giving, but nor a for-profit development venture. With that in mind, any
individual or group looking at locating a for-profit business focused on community
development must take a long, hard look at both the need and capabilities ofthe
community they are looking to enter. In order to be helpful, need must exist, but the
community cannot be devoid of hope and some commercial prospects.
When considering such a project, one is undoubtedly presented with a commdrum
as to how to acquire the necessary resources. Most financial institutions are not going to
be particularly enthusiastic about financing a project that requires taking on a substantial
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of a risk, as this organization does. In Shorebank’s case, it took Grzywinski personally
guaranteeing a $2.4 million loan in order to acquire adequate financing to acquire the
target bank. Extreme dedication and commitment such as this may be required in order
to obtain funding, but other funding sources may include both personal and institutional
investors(most probably foundations and not-for-profits). With this in mind, it is of vital
importance to the success of a community development banking venture that in selection
of a target acquisition, the price be scmtinized to ensure that the financing can be
obtained in a reasonable and affordable manner.
When discussing changes in approach that he would make if capable of starting
Shorebank again, Ron Grzywinski said he would either eliminate the not-for-profit
entities or pay more attention to them (Grzywinski, 2/11/08). It is difficult for any one
individual to effectively manage multiple businesses at the same and it is particularly
challenging when one entity, in this case a bank, is the only one ofthe business areas in
which that individual has worked. There is a natural pull towards that which is familiar.
In Shorebank’s case, the non-bank entities ofthe holding company were somewhat
ignored and left to their own efforts. Such actions eliminated one ofthe vital advantages
of Shorebank Corporation’s business model. While on paper Shorebank should have an
advantage over any other bank in lending success because ofthe support to be provided
by these not-for-profits, Shorebank did not realize this advantage because each group was
merely operating in their own plane of existence and only worked together if they
happened to cross paths while accomplishing their individual goals and projects.
One way to eliminate the disconnect between each entity would be to give one
employee a specific responsibility for managing the interactions between the entities. It
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would be the task of this individual to locate opportunities for the separate entities ofthe
holding company to work in tandem with each other and then to connect those people
within each entity who need to work together in order to take advantage ofthe recognized
opportunity. While this concept of one person working solely on connecting the work of
each entity to the others may seem trivial, such actions would guarantee regular pursuit of
interaction amongst the entities ofthe holding company and provide point man for any
single entity which might be in search ofresources to help them accomplish their goals
on a particular project. Such pursuit of interaction will help to maximize synergistic
gains and provide the maximum benefit to the community in which the development
action is taking place.
Another key issue of importance in starting a development bank would be
ensuring the compilation of a skilled and cohesive group of managers. While it may be
difficult to convince a savvy and experienced banker to venture into community
development lending, an area which many veteran bankers seem to be less than
enthusiastic about, it is important to not put the development bank in the hands of a
young, highly-educated individual. A young, highly-educated individual may be highly
capable of succeeding in the long-run, but according to both Mary Houghton and Ron
Gryzwinski, the means to finding success in community development banking is not
through schooling, but through experience. Gryzwinski suggests that someone must have
gotten “fundamental business experience so it is not all theoretical”(Gryzwinski,
2/11/08) and Houghton suggests that one must have significant experience as a lender,
because otherwise you would have no means of understanding the interaction which takes
place at ground level (Houghton, 2/11/08).
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Beyond the mere educational or experiential requirements of a manager, it is
important to place someone in power who has a good look at the entire picture and will
not focus on only one entity of the holding company. The work ofa not-for-profit social
services entity can be just as beneficial to the community as the allocation of money by
the bank. Anyone intending on managing a bank holding company engaging in
community development must certainly keep this fact in the forefront oftheir mind and
work in a manner that will promote each entity and continue to provide the most utility
possible to the members of the local community.
There are many specific opportunities to improve the operations ofa community
development bank from Shorebank’s model, but for our purposes will only discuss
emphasis on retail banking and the creation and utilization of partnerships. Retail
banking is merely a term for banking with individuals. Much of Shorebank’s work in the
South Shore community dealt with businesses and corporations and not individuals.
There were many reasons that Shorebank had difficulty getting a holding ofthe retail
banking segment, including the community members’ clear preference for the prestige of
having an account at a downtown bank. Mary Houghton cited the lack of retail banking
as one ofthe main obstacles to operating the bank at its maximum profitability and utility
levels (Houghton, 2/11/08). It is virtually impossible to say that a bank has reached its
full potential in helping the community in which it is operating when the bank has not
even acquired enough confidence ofthe community members to provide for their daily
transactions. In order to enter into retail banking, a community development bank must,
like any other bank, advertise aggressively and mn promotional campaigns to acquire
deposits and personal loan requests. To ensure success in this area, it is important to have
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employees who have been successful in retail banking in the past, so as to draw on their
expertise and realize success.
Also, any community development bank could easily benefit from utilizing
partnerships. In Shorebank’s situation, they have not taken hold of such opportunities
often, but they have partnered with Northern Michigan University in implementing one
not-for-profit (Gryzwinski, 2/11/08). The advantage of partnerships is that the
organization, with which you partner, may have a long term vested interest in the
company realizing its vision. Such is the case when dealing with universities, who have a
duel interest in the promotion of the community in which they operate and opportunities
for their students to work with businesses in order to have a more active learning
experience. Such partnerships can provide extra financial, human and informational
resources, community goodwill and a variety of other useful positive contributing factors
of success.
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